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When a corporation goes bankrupt, termination of operations ac-
companies liquidation; hence participation in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings is almost always the last opportunity for those holding claims
against the corporation to collect.' As a general rule, commercial
creditors are allowed to prove their claims in bankruptcy proceedings. 2
The present Bankruptcy Act, however, bars many tort victims from
participating in the final distribution of a corporation's assets.3 The
following hypothetical fact situation illustrates the most important in-
equities in the present treatment of tort claims against corporate bank-
rupts.
Hypothetical Lumber, Inc., has assets consisting largely of virgin
timber land. During October 1967, Hypothetical mistakenly fells trees
belonging to a local businessman and, in its company newspaper, de-
fames another local citizen. The two victims institute law suits in
trespass and libel respectively, and by late August 1968 both suits
seem to be nearing judgment or settlement. On August 28, 1968,
Hypothetical's negligence causes a forest fire which consumes most of
the firm's timber resources. The fire also destroys a large stand of
timber owned by ABC Corporation but managed by Hypothetical
under an agreement providing that Hypothetical should protect the
timber from all damage. Several persons, including an elderly lady
who owes Hypothetical $500 for firewood purchased, are severely
burned in the fire. Only one of the injured files suit before August
31st. On that date, Hypothetical's management, aware that the destruc-
tion of its timber resources has rendered the firm hopelessly insolvent,
files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.
1. An adjudication of bankruptcy does not automatically terminate corporate exis-
tence. In re Russell Wheel & Foundry Co., 222 F. 569 (E.D. Midu. 1915); Morley v.
Thayer, 3 F. 737 (C.C.D. Mass. 1880); see Chemical Bank v. Hartford Deposit Co., 161
US. 1 (1895). However, the bankruptcy process distributes all of a corporation's assets.
Hence, claimants against the corporation who cannot participate in bankruptcy pro.
ceedings are unable to reach any assets to satisfy judgments which technically they
could still obtain outside bankruptcy. Members of the House of Representatives have
recognized the irrelevance of nondischargeability to the creditors of a corporation:
"Although a corporate bankrupt is theoretically not discharged, the corporation normally
ceases to exist upon bankruptcy and unsatisfied tax claims as well as other unsatisfied
claims are without further recourse ...... H.R. REP. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1965).
2. Creditors with claims based on open account or on express or implied contracts
may prove their claims. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(4) (1964).
3. This Note is concerned with the treatment of tort claims against corporations only
in straight bankruptcy proceedings under Sections 1-72 of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C.§§ 1-112 (1964).
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Although insolvent,4 Hypothetical has sufficient assets to pay a
bankruptcy dividend of fifty cents per claim dollar to its unsecured
creditors, including all of the described tort claimants. Under current
bankruptcy law, however, certain of the tort victims have claims that
are not provable in bankruptcy; these victims are not permitted to
share in the distribution of the bankrupt's assets. Thus, even though
participation in the bankruptcy process is the tort victims' only chance
for recovery, the damage claims of the libel and trespass' victims and
the claims of all those injured in the fire who have not instituted suits
prior to bankruptcy will not be honored. Only ABC (suing on a con-
tract theory) and the one injured person who begins his suit before
August 31st have provable claims. Not only is the elderly lady unable
to collect for her injuries, but she also remains liable for her debt to
Hypothetical, the proceeds from which will be divided among those
creditors holding provable claims.
These curious results come about because the Bankruptcy Act makes
only certain types of tort claims provable. All tort claims reduced to a
fixed liability at the date the bankruptcy petition is filed, as evidenced
by a written settlement agreement or by a judgment, are provable."
Likewise, any workmen's compensation award for injury or death from
injury is provable,7 as is any claim based on a tort action for negligence
that is pending at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.8 Moreover,
if a claim based on tort can also be regarded as based on breach of an
express or implied contract, it may be proved as a contract claim.9 And
if the bankrupt has been unjustly enriched as a result of its tortious
conduct, a claim based on quasi-contract for benefit received may
4. A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provision of this Act whenever the
aggregate of his property exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed,
transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with
intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be
sufficient, in amount to pay his debts.
11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1964).
5. The trespass victim will, however, be able to prove his claim to the extent
Hypothetical was unjustly enriched by cutting the trees. See text & note 10 infra.
6. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(l) (1964).
7. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(6), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(6) (1964).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(7) (1964).
9. Thus an injured paying passenger may base his claim on a breach of the con-
tractual duty of safe carriage. In re Great Orme Tramways Co., 50 T.L.R. 450 (Ch.
1934). A person injured by her hairdresser may prove her claim or a breach of the duty
to do a reasonably careful job. Dixon v. Kantor, 165 Misc. 315, 299 N.Y.S. 507 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1937). Or a claim for damaged goods, if based on a breach of warranty, may
be proved. F.L. Grant Shoe Co. v. W.M. Laird Co., 212 U.S. 445 (1909). Generally, if
the claim arose during a contractual relationship between the bankrupt and the claimant,
it is provable. However, it is not sufficient to establish merely that the clainmant was
an employee of the bankrupt. In re Crescent Lumber Co., 154 F. 724 (S.D. Ala. 1007).
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sometimes be proved against the bankrupt's estate.10 But those claims
not specifically made provable by the Bankruptcy Act may not be
proved at all," and may not even be asserted as a setoff or counterclaim
against a suit brought by the corporation's trustee in bankruptcy. 1°2
The result is that most tort claims
will be denied participation in the bankruptcy procedure. Others
will be received only to be cast out; only a few will run the course
of bankruptcy proceeding and be subject to its asset gathering
and distributing processes.
13
When the Bankruptcy Act denies recovery in bankruptcy proceedings
for tort claims against a corporation, the tort claimant may be able to
obtain compensation from the corporation's insurers,14 from the cor-
poration's employee who actually committed the tort, or from the
corporation's shareholders. But unfortunately for the average tort
claimant, these roads to recovery are not often open.
A bankrupt corporation, which normally will have been poorly
managed and inadequately financed, will probably not have carried
sufficient insurance for tort liability. Some corporations heading
toward bankruptcy carry no liability insurance whatsoever, while
others insure only to the inadequate extent required by state law.'
5
10. Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920); Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904);
United States v. Duggan, 210 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1954); Clarke v. Rogers, 183 F. 518 (Ist
Cir. 1910), aff'd, 9228 U.S. 534 (1913). Such claims are provable only to the extent that
the bankrupt tortfeasor was unjustly enriched, which may be considerably less than the
total damages to the victim. In addition, a claim for patent infringement is not provable
even to the extent of unjust enrichment. Goldsmith v. Overseas Scientific Corp.. 188
F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); In re Paramount Publix Corp., 8 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y.
1934). Contra, Schiff v. Hammond Clock, 69 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1934), vacated as moot,
293 U.S. 529 (1934).
11. Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920); Goldsmith v. Overseas Scientific Corp.,
188 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); In re Shawsheen Diary, Inc.. 47 F. Supp. 494 (D. Mass.
1942).
12. Bankruptcy Act § 68, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
13. Joslin, Torts & Bankruptcy-A Synthesis, I B.C. IND. & Co,. L. Ruv. 185, 195
(1960).
14. Although the bankrupt corporation's estate is not liable for non-provable claims,
the obligations of the insurers of a corporation are not ordinarily terminated by bank-
ruptcy. However, some insurance policies stipulate that the insurer is liable to reim-
burse the insured only for damage payments which the insured has actually made.
Thus, since a bankrupt corporation does not pay any non-provable claims, the insurer
is not obligated to compensate the tort victim. Many states have wisely prohibited the
issuance of this type of insurance, but such policies still exist and occasionally prevent
a tort victim from recovery against the insurer. For a discussion of such insurance and
citation of state statutes forbidding it, see W. VANcE, INsuRANcE § 135 (3d ed. 1951).
15. A typical state requirement is that corporations insure against motor vehicle tort
liability. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act § 3, N.Y. Vrnicix & TnArnAc
LAw § 312 (McKinney 1960). High deductibility provisions (the insurer is not liable for
damages which are less than a certain amount) and low maximum liability limits (the
insurer is not liable for damages in excess of a set amount) are other limitations found
in the insurance programs of corporations which are likely to go bankrupt. For an exam-
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Moreover, even an insured corporation is unlikely to insure itself
against those tort claims which are least likely to be provable-such as
patent and copyright infringement and willful torts.
The tort victim holding a non-provable claim may, of course, sue the
corporate employee who is personally liable for the tort. The basic
weakness of this remedy is that most such employees are uninsured and
judgment proof. For many modem corporate torts, moreover, although
it is easy to place liability on a corporation, it is nearly impossible to
identify the specific employee responsible. 16 Finally, the courts will
sometimes allow creditors to "pierce the corporate veil" and recover
from stockholders of a bankrupt corporation directly.Y Such suits,
however, are usually founded on a reliance element lacking in tort
cases.'
The exclusion of many tort claims from a corporation's bankruptcy
proceedings coupled with the unavailability or inadequacy of claims
against the corporation's insurer, employees, or stockholders results in
a denial of compensation to many victims of torts committed by cor-
porations that later become bankrupt.' 9 Of course the non-provability
of many tort claims makes a difference only when the bankrupt cor-
poration has assets sufficient to pay some amount on general claims
after paying the claims given priority by the Bankruptcy Act.2 0 In such
cases, the present exclusion of tort claims allows those holding provable
claims to receive more per dollar of claim than they would if the ex-
cluded tort claims were made provable. Since most of their claims are
contractual, commercial creditors would favor continuing the present
pie of seriously inadequate statutory maximum liability limits, see Mull v. Colt Co.,
31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
16. For instance, if a man is hit by a falling piece of steel while he is walking below
a high-rise construction project, it may well be impossible to determine which construc.
tion worker caused the object to fall, even allowing for the extension of res ipsa loquitor
found in Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). Nevertheless, It Is
clear that, under most circumstances, the construction corporation would be liable for
damages.
17. Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). A recent decision of the California
Supreme Court has allowed tort victims to recover from the primary commercial lender
of a corporation whose tortious activities were known or should have been known by
the lender. Connor v. Great Western Say. S, Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 887, 73 Cal. Rptr. 869
447 P.2d 609 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942). For a dis.
cussion of the current limits of the "veil-piercing" doctrine and a proposal for sub-
stantially expanding it, see Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the
Torts of Their Corporations, 76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967).
19. Torts for which a corporation's estate is liable which occur after a bankruptcy
petition is filed give rise to claims which are entitled to first priority as administrative
expenses. Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1964); see Reading Co. v. Brown, 891
U.S. 471 (1968).
20. Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1964).
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treatment of tort claims. On the other hand, commercial creditors-
unlike the victims of corporate torts-often enter voluntarily into
credit relations with financially weak corporations.21 Solid justification
is necessary for favoring commercial creditors over tort claimants.
One justification offered for excluding many tort claims from bank-
ruptcy proceedings is that historically bankruptcy has been exclusively
a commercial device.22 But American bankruptcy laws have never
been confined to commercial claims; they have long permitted the as-
sertion of tort claims reduced to judgment prior to bankruptcy.? More
importantly, the fact that bankruptcy law has traditionally favored
commercial debts does not justify the present exclusion of tort claims
against bankrupt corporations. Most modem observers recognize that
such claims should be viewed as costs of business operation differing in
no important respect from debts for supplies or labor used in the busi-
ness.
24
A second frequently asserted justification is that tort liability is per-
sonal and quasi-criminal and therefore only the tort feasor, and not
his creditors, should be subjected to the punishment of paying tort
damages. 25 When the tort feasor is a corporation this argument implies
not going beyond the stockholder's equity to satisfy tort claims.20 But
this justification for denying many tort claimants the right to share
with commercial creditors in the assets of the bankrupt corporation is
not consistent with modem tort theory, which considers the compensa-
tion of victims a primary function of tort liability. - Moreover, non-
21. For example suppose a corporation owning taxi cabs negligently injures a pas-
senger and a pedestrian in the same accident. While the passenger can prove his daim
on the basis of implied contract, the pedestrian can prove his only if he has filed a
negligence suit before bankruptcy. A cynic might observe that the person who enters
a taxi (at least in New York City) should be treated less favorably than the pedestrian,
as he has assumed the risk. Such an observation is by no means facetious in many busimess
situations. When tortious conduct is also a breach of a contractual duty, the injured
party can often foresee the possibility of injury and take the opportunity to make
certain that the risk is insured.
22. Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920).
23. Glenn, Basic Considerations in Tort Claims in Bankruptcy and Reorganization,
18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 567, 369 (1941). As Glenn suggests, the provability of tort judgments
was justified by regarding the judgments, through the fiction of "contract on record,"
as contractual debts.
24. See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts.
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Aforris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
25. G. GLENN, LIQUIDATION § 466 (1935).
26. Of course, since assets less liabilities equal shareholder equity, by definition
there can be no shareholder's equity when a corporation is bankrupt.
27. See Calabresi, supra note 24; Morris, supra note 24; Glenn observes that while
at common law tort claims generally could not be proved against a decedent's estate,
many jurisdictions have, by statute, made these torts provable. He argues that the law
should regard proving torts against a corporation as analogous to proving torts against
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fault tort liability, which represents society's apportionment of the
risks of particular activities, should not be regarded as punitive in any
sense. Finally, the argument that tort claims are punishment from
which the bankrupt's creditors ought to be shielded seems to be im-
plicitly rejected by the present Act itself in that some fault-based tort
claims are provable in circumstances in which non-fault tort claims
could not be proved.2
A third justification sometimes offered is that because tort claims are
contingent in validity and amount, proving them would delay the
bankruptcy process.29 The short answer to this argument is that those
tort claims which would cause undue delay should be excludable, not
because they are tort claims, but because they will take too long to
process. Section 57d of the present Act 3° independently authorizes a
bankruptcy court to disallow any claim if its liquidation would un-
duly delay the administration of the debtor's estate. There is therefore
no need to make whole classes of tort claims non-provable because of
the danger that particular claims might cause undue delay.31
In sum, there is no adequate justification for the present exclusion
of many tort claims against bankrupt corporations. Perhaps this treat-
a decedent's estate because both situations present the last chance for a tort victim
to receive compensation for his injuries. G. GLENN, LIQUIDATION § 490 (1935). This
analogy seems persuasive: the change in the law of decedents' estates is also cogent
evidence of the shift in the function of tort law from penal to compensatory objectives.
The shift, as we have seen, undermines one of the justifications for excluding tort claims
from bankruptcy. See p. 479 supra.
28. Non-fault torts must be reduced to judgment at the date the bankruptcy petition
is filed in order to be proved. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(1) (196-1). In
contrast, negligent torts are provable if a suit has been instituted and is pending when
the petition is filed. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(7) (1964).
29. In re Shawsheen Dairy, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 494 (D. Mass. 1942). Judge Wyzanskl
summarizes the various justifications commonly offered in support of the exclusion of
tort claims. Id. at 498.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 93d (1964).
31. The operation of the present tort claim exclusion on counterclaims by the
corporation's debtors provides a good illustration that these rules of provability have
no relation to whether a particular claim or even a group of claims may be easily
liquidated. Bankruptcy Act § 68a, 11 U.S.C. § 108a (1964), dictates that in the case of
mutual debts between the estate of the bankrupt and a creditor, one debt should be
set off against the other, and only the net balance shall be allowed the claimant or
be paid to the bankrupt. Section 68b, 11 U.S.C. § 108b (1964), however, states that
claims that are not provable are not permissible setoffs. See New York Credit Men's
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Bruno-New York, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
But a setoff or counterclaim arises only when the bankruptcy trustee has already filed
a law suit and thereby asserted a claim which itself will take time to liquidate. Unless
and until the trustee completes that lawsuit, the setoff has no effect; so there Is no
need to exclude the setoff on the grounds that the administration of the estate will
be unduly hindered. There may be situations in which allowing a setoff or counter-
claim would unduly delay the bankruptcy process-for example, if the trustee sues
to recover a simple debt and the defendant counterclaims with a highly speculative
and complex patent infringement suit. Nevertheless these situations could best be
judged by the more precise test of Section 57d.
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ment of tort claims has resulted in large part because actual and po-
tential tort claimants have had little collective influence in the develop-
ment of the Bankruptcy Act.32 The uneven play of interest group
pressures has given us a Bankruptcy Act that unreasonably discrimi-
nates between claims of substantially equivalent merit.
33
In the case of the bankruptcy of natural persons, there might be
some rationality in the present system requiring some tort claimants
to participate with general creditors in the bankrupt's estate and re-
quiring others to assert their claims only against those assets accumu-
lated by the bankrupt after bankruptcy.34 In the case of a bankrupt
corporation, however, to permit only some tort claims to be proved
makes no sense at all. Valid tort claims are as much costs of operating
a business as are amounts due for goods received, and yet those tort
claimants who are not allowed to prove their claims in the bankruptcy
proceedings will never be able to look to the corporation for compensa-
tion.35
The conclusion that all pre-bankruptcy torts ought to be provable
against a corporate bankrupt has already been accepted in those chap-
ters of the Bankruptcy Act providing for the rehabilitation rather than
liquidation of insolvent corporations.30 It would appear desirable to
52. The Bankruptcy Act is very much a product of interest group politics. As justice
Pitney indicated: "It [the Act] was the result of a long period of agitation, participated
in by commercial conventions, boards of trade, chambers of commerce. and other com-
mercial bodies." Schall v. Camors, 51 U.S. 239, 250 (1920).
Prior to 1934 only tort claims evidenced by a judmnent or settlement at the time a
bankruptcy petition was filed were provable. In 1934, Section 63a of the Act was
amended by adding clause (6) which made workmen's compensation awards provable.
Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 4a(6), 48 Stat. 911. Also, in 1934, negligence claims
represented by a lawsuit filed and pending at the time of the filing of a petition werem
made provable. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 4a(6V4), 48 Stat. 911. Claue 6V, wa
enacted to increase the value and effect of a discharge to a bankrupt natural person.
Debtors and labor were powerful political forces in the United States in 1934. Then as
now, however, there was no national association of tort victims.
33. For example, there is no justification for negligent tort clains' receiving more
favorable treatment than willful tort claims. Yet, under Section 63a of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103a (1964), tort claims founded on negligence are more likely to be
provable. Similarly, if a negligence victim is negotiating an out-of-court settlement and
bankruptcy ensues, his claim is not provable unless he has a firm contract of settle-
ment. But a victim who refuses to negotiate and files suit before bankruptcy has a
provable claim. Again there is no adequate justification for favoring one cla-s of
tort victims.
34. If a tort claim is not provable, it is not dischargeable. Bankruptcy Act § 17.
11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964). As a result, the holder of such a claim may assert it against
assets which a bankrupt natural person acquires after bankruptcy. In some situations
the holder of a nonprovable claim may receive more compensation after bankruptcy
than he would have if his claim had been provable.
35. See note 1 supra.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 215b(5) (Section 77, Railroad Reorganization); I I U.S.C. § 506(1)
(Chapter X, Corporate Reorganization); 11 U.S.C. § 707(2) (Chapter XI, Arrangements);
11 U.S.C. § 806(2) (Chapter XII, Real Property Arrangements); 11 U.S.C. § 1006(11) (Chap-
ter XIII, Wage Earners Plans) (1964). And tort claims not provable under present law
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alter the treatment of tort claims in straight bankruptcy so that all
such claims against corporations are made provable in every type of
proceeding authorized by the Bankruptcy Act. This alteration could be
accomplished by adding a tenth clause to Section 63a of the Bank-
ruptcy Act:37
[Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his
estate which are founded upon.. .] (10) the right to recover from
a bankrupt corporation actual damages caused by an act prior to
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy for or against the corpora-
tion.
To avoid penalizing creditors for the "sins" of the corporation, the
proposed amendment would make provable only actual, not punitive,
damages.38 The amendment would in no way alter the general rule
that a bankruptcy court has, within its sound discretion, the power to
select the most appropriate method of liquidating any claim.40 Thus,
a bankruptcy court may itself liquidate any tort claim or may decide
to await the determination of another court of competent jurisdiction. 40
If it is thought unfair to allow the tort victim in a rare case to obtain
partial compensation from the bankrupt corporation's insurer, em-
ployees, or stockholders and then to participate ratably with all the
general creditors of the bankrupt until full compensation for the cor-
poration's tort is obtained, Section 65 could be amended to prevent a
tort claimant from getting ahead of general creditors because of partial
compensation from outside sources. 4 '
Since the proposed amendment to Section 63a makes more tort
claims provable, the total number of claims provable against a bank-
rupt corporation's estate would naturally increase in many cases. As a
result, other commercial creditors would receive a smaller share of the
corporation's assets than they would under present law. However,
were provable in equity receiverships for corporations. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New
York City Ry., 161 F. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 103a (1964).
38. This result would be consistent with the general policy of the Act not to Inflict
upon the bankrupt's creditors penalties for the acts of the bankrupt. For example,
Section 57j of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93j (1964), makes debts owed to the
government as penalties non-allowable.
39. See 3 W. CoLLER, BANKRUPrCY 57.15 (14th ed. 1961); cf. Ex parte Baldwin,
291 U.S. 610 (1934).
40. See generally 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 57.15 (14th ed. 1961).
41. Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 65d, 11 U.S.C. § 105d (1964), which provides that creditors
who have received dividends on their claims in foreign bankruptcy proceedings shall
not participate in the distribution of a bankrupt's assets until all creditors of the same
class have received an equal percentage dividend on their claims. If desirable, Section 65
could be amended by adding a section analogous to Subsection d to require similar
treatment for those whose claims have been partially satisfied by the bankrupt's Insurance.
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commercial creditors could protect themselves from this possibility by
insisting that a corporation maintain adequate tort liability insurance
before credit is extended.42 Such an enforcement of insurance require-
ments by creditors would increase the probability that the tort victims
of financially weak corporations would be compensated for their in-
juries.
42. In fact, it would be easier for commercial creditors to protect themselves by
determining whether a corporation is adequately insured than it is for a creditor to
determine the corporation's tax liabilities. Yet claims based on tax liability have a
priority over unsecured commercial claims under Section 64 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104
(1964), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (Supp. 1968).
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